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DROIT DE SUITE AND CONFLICTING
PRIORITIES: THE UNLIKELY CASE FOR

VISUAL ARTISTS' RESALE ROYALTY
RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES
. INTRODUCTION

Democrat Representative Jerrold Nadler from New York
proposed a new piece of legislation called the "American Royalties
Too Act of 2014" which required, with some restrictions, that visual artists receive royalties if their works of art are resold in an
auction.I By amending Title 17 of the United States Code to include this provision, the United States would have followed the
European example by adopting a pseudo droit de suite into Copyright law. 2 Droit de suite, often referred in the United States as a
resale royalty right, allows an artist to receive a royalty when his
or her work is resold.3 This is important, especially for a visual
artist, whose artwork is unique and he cannot receive a profit from
making copies (unlike authors or musicians who can mass produce
their works), because the original artist can benefit from a possible
increase in value of the artwork after its original sale. 4 The
"American Royalties Too Act of 2014" was a revision of the rejected Equity for Visual Artists Act of 2011, which received very
little support in Congress; in fact, this was the fifth attempt in proposing resale royalties legislation to Congress.5 With this poor
history of unsuccessful attempts in passing this legislation, it appears unlikely that visual artists of the United States will ever benefit from resale royalties. This is unfortunate, as the analysis of
1American Royalties Too Act of 2014, H.R. 4103, 113th Cong. (2014), available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/ 113th-congressihouse-bill/4103/text
2 Id; Office of the Register of Copyrights, USCO Resale Royalty Report,
4
(2013).
"USCO Resale Royalty Report"
3
1d.
4Id. at 11, n.60.

5 Id. at 6-9. These include the Equity for Visual Artists Act of 2011,
S. 2000,

112th Cong. (20011), Visual Artists Rights Act of 1987, S. 1619, 100th Cong.
(1987), Visual Artists Rights Amendment of 1986, S. 2796, 99th Cong. (1986),
and Visual Artists' Residual Rights Act of 1978, H.R. 11403, 95th Cong.
(1978).
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the historical and moral elements of droit de suite clearly indicate
that resale royalties are rights that help protect and promote a visual artist's craft. Not only will a droit de suite promote the arts, it is
a matter of fundamental fairness that visual artists receive the continual benefit of their work, as do other types of artists.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Overview of the Copyright System
1. How CurrentLaw Treats Visual Artists/FirstSale Doctrine
According to the United States Copyright Act, artists, including visual artists, have a "bundle of exclusive rights" with regards to their works. 6 These basic rights protect most creative
works and are relatively uniform around the world.7 In the United
States, an author has six basic rights in this "bundle:" to copy the
work, to prepare derivate works, to distribute the work, to publically perform the work, to publically display the work, and for sound
recordings, to publically perform the work through a digital transmission. 8 A resale royalty right would allow artists to continually
benefit from their distribution right.9
B. Defining Royalties and Droit de Suite
1. Moral rights, generally
According to French law, all artists, whether visual or not,
have four moral rights: the right of paternity, the right of integrity,
the right to release, and the right to withdraw or modify. 10 These
6 USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 10; see 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(l)-(6).
7 USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 10. I'm not seeing the portion of the text
"... and are relatively uniform around the world" in this citation.
8 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(6).
9 17 U.S.C. § 106(3).

10 In French, la droit b la patermite, la droit au respect de l'oeuvre, la droit de

divulgation, et la droit de retraitou de repentir.Michael B. Reddy, The Droit de
Suite: Why American Fine Artists Should Have the Right to a Resale Royalty, 15
Loy. L.A. Ent. L.J. 509, 514 (1995).
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rights are continuous and absolute." These can be considered the
French equivalent of the United States Copyright "bundle" of
rights. The French law differs from the American law because in
12
the United States, there are no moral rights in the Copyright Act.
2. Droit de Suite (France)
a. Albert Vaunois andEvolution
The concept of droit de suite was first mentioned in an article written in 1893 in the journal "Chronique de Paris," by Albert
Vaunois, a French attorney.13 In this article, he defended the rights
of artists and highlighted that writers, musicians, and authors could
all have their works represented in multiple areas while visual artists could not perceive their paintings or sculptures ever being reproduced in this manner. 14 This French tradition of realizing there
are different rights between visual artists and other types of artists
continued when Edouard Mack, another French attorney, addressed this issue in a report to the Berne Congress of the International Literary and Artistic Association in 1896.' 5 He stated that
the droit de suite converges with moral rights while sharing many
of its characteristics. In order to enact a droit de suite into French
law, the Soci6t6 des Amis du Luxembourg was formed in 1903.6
The Socirt6 wrote a report dealing with inherent unfairness that
artists who create art that can be reproduced, such as photographers and engravers, could profit from selling their artwork in multiples whereas other visual artists would lose any profit if their
work were resold.' 7 They submitted text to the French minister
I Reddy at 514.
2

See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1)-(6).
Reddy at 515, 545 n.59.
14 Yann Gaillard, March de I'Art: les chances de la France, StNAT (April 29,
1999), availableat http://www.senat.fr/rap/r98-330/r98-33012.html.
15 Reddy at 515.
16 WIPO, Organe Mensuel du Bureau Internationalde L 'Union pour la Protection des Oeuvre Littkraires et Artistiques, A Berne, 20 LE DROIT D'AUTEUR, 21
(Feb.
5,
1907)
("Le
Droit
D'Auteur"),
available
at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/fr/copyright/120/wipo-pub 120_ 1907_02.p
df.
17 Le Droit D'Auteur, at 21-22.
1

13
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stating that even though the actual object is in possession of the
collector, the right of reproduction remains the property of the crethat right.1 8
ator of the artwork unless he otherwise disposes of
eventually culminate into France's
The Socit6's beliefs would
9
1920 droit de suite law.'
3. Rationalesfor Droit de Suite
a. Legal Justificationsof Droit de Suite
As Karyn A. Temple Claggett, the Associate Register of
Copyrights and Director of Policy and International Affairs United
States Copyright Office stated in her statement before the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Internet Committee on the Judiciary, "A resale royalty right is typically justified
by the unique way in which some visual artists are affected by the
copyright system., 20 The initial underlying idea of droit de suite
was to allow the artist to benefit and receive meaningful compensation from the increased value of his artwork when it was resold.2' An active droit de suite in the United States fulfills the
Copyright Clause's original intent, which is to promote the pro22
gress of the arts. Visual artists differ drastically from other types
of artists, such as composers or musicians, because of the means
by which they are able to manipulate and promote their artwork.
The latter gain profits from the mass production and transmission
of their work whereas visual artists create a unique object of which
mass production is impossible.23 According to current copyright
law, once an artist sells his painting, for example, he cannot bene18Le Droit D'Auteur at 22("En consequence, le droit de reproduction demeure
la propridt6 du cr6ateur de l'oeuvre d'art, Amoins qu'il n'ait dispose de ce droit
d'une fagon expresse.").
19Reddy at 515.
20 Karyn A. Temple Claggett, "Moral Rights, Termination Rights, Resale Royalty, and Copyright Term, " Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property and the

Internet Committee on the Judiciary, United States House of Representatives,
113th Congress, 2nd Session, 1 (July 15, 2014).
21 Reddy at 517.
22

ld.at 535.

23 Id. at 517.
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fit from subsequent sales of this painting as can other artists. 24 If
his work of art appreciates in value over time, it will usually only
economically benefit a third party, such as an auction house, dealer, or collector, and not the artist himself.25 For example, a writer
can receive royalties from every copy of his book sold and can
continually benefit beyond his initial sale, whereas once a visual
artist sells a piece of art, he does not receive economic benefit
from it beyond the initial sale. Ralph Oman, the then-Register of
Copyrights, 26 stated in 1989:
Works of visual art present special challenges in
copyright law because of the nature of their creation
and dissemination. They are neither mass produced
nor mass distributed. They often exist only in a single copy. After the sale of that unique work the first
sale doctrine of the copyright law has prevented artists from sharing in the increased value of their
works the way composers, playwrights and chore27
ographers can.

Although some artists are able to financially benefit from exploiting their work though reproductions or different means of distribution, this may not be possible for many visual artists; the very nature of the visual art is limited to its original form and there may
not be a market for reproductions or different means of copyright
exploitations.
Having a droitde suite element added to the current Copyright Act would, in fact, help further the initial intent of the Copyright Clause by "promoting the progress" of the arts.28 If a visual
artist could continually benefit from the resale of his artwork, it
would permit him to profit from the increasing value of his work
Id.
Temple Claggett at. 2.
This was during the pre-VARA hearing in front of the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Courts, intellectual Property, and the Administration
of Justice. USCO Resale Royalty Report at 11.
27 Hearing on H.R. 2690, Visual Artists Rights Act of 1989 Before
the Subcomm.
On Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 10 1st Cong. 27 (1989).
28 Reddy at 535; see U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8.
24

25
26
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after the first sale. 29 Even if there is a depreciation of the artwork's value, the artist would still benefit economically in the future from a resale. Allowing visual artists to economically profit
after the first sale incentivizes them to continue to create works of
art, thus fulfilling the Copyright Clause's intent. Artists are not
only motivated by the prospect of economic gain, but the mere
creation of additional art and allowing the public to view and appreciate it makes the world more aesthetic and cultured. The United States Supreme Court in Fogerty v. Fantasy unanimously reaffirmed this Copyright principle. In this case, the Court stated
through "the provision of a special reward," such a droit de suite,
artists should be rewarded for their creativity thus fueling further
motivation to create. 30 Such "special reward" of continued economic incentives would fulfill the intent of the Copyright Clause.
i. Do artists have weak bargainingpower?
Historically, the "starving artist" rationale for a droit de
suite has been prevalent in order to create a balance in the perceived weak bargaining position an artist has with his buyers. Although there are clearly isolated incidents where artists have been
mistreated because of their weak bargaining power, there is not a
great deal of empirical evidence to substantiate that this is prevalent.3 1 In a study done by Randall K. Filer, he analyzed the 1980
census data, investigating artists' earnings, and concluded that artists earned relatively the same amount as others who had similar
personal characteristics and training. 32 It is important to note that
the empirical data shows that the starving artist stories meant to
stir one's emotions may no longer be completely accurate.
Another classic argument is that artists have weak bargaining power. Some perceive that there is an imbalance of bargaining
power between artists who want to retain some of their exclusive
copyright rights and collectors or dealers who are cautious about
29

Reddy at 535.
Reddy at 545;see Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526 (1994).
3" Guy A. Rub, The Unconvincing Casefor Resale Royalties, 124 YALE L.J. F.,
30

1,2(2014).
32 Randall K. Filer, The "StarvingArtist"- Myth or Reality? Earningsof Artists

in the United States, 94 J.POL. ECON. 56 (1986).
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allowing the artist to retain any of these rights. 33 Some artists must
sign away all of their exclusive copyright rights in order to make a
sale. This is especially prevalent with emerging artists who must
often sign away their rights in order to sell their works. 34 Although
artists may have weaker bargaining power initially and with concerns of copyright rights, they also have more advantages than
other types of artists. For example, visual artists do not have to
have contact with "powerful intermediaries with substantial market
power" in order to sell their work.3 5 Visual artists do not need to
search though the limited number of record labels or publishers to
find representation; there are over 6,000 art dealers and galleries in
the United States. 36 Visual artists can receive fair consideration
for their artwork in the competitive market due to the sheer quantity of ways their artwork can be exposed. Although the bargaining
power of artists is dependent on a case-by-case basis, it is important to understand that artists can have an element of bargaining
power and not all of them are "starving."
ii. Does the CopyrightAct DisfavorArtists?
Despite the evidence that visual artists do not receive proportional benefits for creating works as do other artists, there are
arguments that the Copyright Act may in fact favor visual artists.
Those who oppose a United States droit de suite have argued that
all artists, including visual artists, have equal rights from copyright
law because they all have the right to sell their work and license
reproductions. 3 7 It is entirely possible that a visual artist could
make more money from an initial sale than might other artists,
such as an author selling a manuscript, which may then be sold in
copies. Additionally, copyright law helps correct market failures
for non-visual artists. Copies of non-visual works are nearly identical substitutes for the originals. Without copyright protection,
33 Design and Artists Copyright Society, DA CS Artists Survey, 3 (2011),
availa-

ble
at
http://www.dacs.org.uk/DACSO/media/DACSDocs/DACS-artistsurveysummary.pdf.
34 USCO Resale Royalty Report at 12, n.64.
31 Rub at 2.
361d

37 USCO Resale Royalty Report at 32.
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publishers would be able to drive prices down to the marginal cost
of creating the work by making these perfect copies, thus destroying the non-visual artist's incentive to create as he will not be able
to earn back the costs of creation. 38 Copyright law fixed this problem by giving reproduction rights to artists thus making it illegal to
copy the work without the artist's permission. 39 Visual artists,
however, do not suffer from this reproduction issue because, in
general, a copy of a work of visual art is not an identical or suitable substitute for the original artwork.4 ° Copying a visual'work of
art does not have the same market and economic effect on the author as copying a non-visual work of art. Because of this, a visual
artist is not barred from collecting the full value of the artwork (including his marginal costs, fixed costs, and expected revenue from
the artwork) during the initial sale in the primary market. 41 The
Copyright Act was meant to correct the market failure for nonvisual artists, as it has done. Arguments advocating that the Copyright Act disfavors visual artists are misplaced because the wrong
that the Act is meant to remedy may not necessarily be applicable
to visual artists.
C. Droit de Suite Policy aroundthe World
International copyright protection first came to being in the
middle of the nineteenth century through the use of bilateral treaties. 42 Today, over seventy different countries worldwide recognize some form of droit de suite for their visual artists; over thirty
have adopted these laws since the 1992 United States Copyright
Office Report.43

38 Rub at 3.
39 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) ("The owner of copyright under this title has the ex-

rights to.. .reproduce the copyright work in copies or phonorecords.").
clusive
40
Rub at 3.
41id.

WIPO Handbook on IntellectualProperty: Policy, Law and Use, WIPO, 262
(2004).
43 USCO Resale Royalty Report at 2.
42
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1. The Berne Conventionfor the ProtectionofLiterary and Artistic
Works
The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works was formulated based on the need for a uniform,
international system to protect and enforce copyright rights.4 4 The
Berne Convention was adopted on September 9, 1886, and is the
oldest international copyright treaty. 4 5 It has been continually revised in order to adapt to the changing field and needs presented
by international copyright. 46 France proposed adding a resale royalty provision to the Beme Convention, which was added in
194847. The Berne Convention contains a droit de suite provision
providing "an inalienable right to an interest in any sale of the
work subsequent to the first transfer by the author of the work" for
all visual and non-visual art.4 8 When this provision was added,
many countries opposed a resale royalty. In order to ease these
countries' concerns, an additional provision was added making
droit de suite optional.4 9 It was not necessary for Member States
of the Berne Convention to implement this right but the right is reciprocal; if a country did not implement a droitde suite, its citizens
could not receive a resale royalty in other countries.
This is an
unusual provision because this is one of the only exceptions to the
Berne Convention's obligation that Member States treat other
Member States in the same manner in which they would treat their
own citizens. 51 The United States is a signatory to the Berne Con-

44 WIPO Handbook on Intellectual Property at 262.
45 WIPO Handbook on Intellectual Property at 262.
46

id.

47 USCO Resale Royalty Report at 4.
48 World Intellectual Property Organization, Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Art. 14ter(l), "Droit de suite" in Works of
Art and Manuscripts (Sept. 9, 1886).
49 Id. at Art. 14ter(2)( The protection provided by the preceding paragraph
may
be claimed in a country of the Union only if legislation in the country to which
the author belongs to permits, and to the extent permitted by the country where
this
protection is claimed.).
50
id.

"' Id. at Art. 5(1) ("Authors shall enjoy, in respect of works for which they are
protected under this Convention, in countries of the Union other than the country of origin, the rights which their respective laws do now or may hereafter
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vention; it has not, however, implemented a droit de suite because,
according to Article 14ter(2), it was not required to do so to be a
signatory. 52 A consequence of not implementing droit de suite is
that American artists cannot receive a resale royalty if their artwork is resold on the international secondary art market to a country that does have a droit de suite. The secondary art market is an
international market, and this can pose as a problem if artists cannot receive royalties when their works are sold in a country that
does offer a droit de suite.
2. EU 2001 Directive
In 2001, in an effort to harmonize resale royalty rights, the
European Union adopted a Directive requiring its Member States
to establish droit de suite legislation by 2006. Many observed an
imbalance in the European market because droit de suite was applied in different ways between Member States, and it was completely absent in others.54 Since this right applies in the country
where the sale occurs, there was the potential for art transactions to
move from countries that had this right to ones that did not in order
to avoid extra costs. 55 The European Commission decided that in
order to balance the European art market, either all Member States
had to adopt a resale royalty, or it would be uniformly abolished.
The Commission decided to institute a consistent droit de suite and
56
adopted Directive 2001/84/EC in 2001 which established this.
This Directive required EU member states to create droit de suite
legislation where a work of visual art was resold under the purview
grant to their nationals, as well as the rights specially granted by this Convention.").
52 USCO Resale Royalty Report at 5.
53 Council Directive 2001/84/EC of the EuropeanParliamentand of the Council
of 27 September 2001 on the Resale Right for the Benefit of the Author of an
Original Work of Art, WIPO, 2001 O.J. (L 272) 32-36 (2001), available at
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?fileid= 180301.
54 Claire McAndrew, Observations on the Art Trade over 25 Years, THE
available at
(2012)
176
FOUNDATION,
FINE
ART
EUROPEAN
https://www.tefaf.com/media/tefafmedia/TEFAF%20AMR%202012%20DEF_
LR.pdf.
55 Id.
56

d.
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of "art market professionals. 57 This broad language allowed these
European countries to make laws to include works resold by the
entire art market, such as dealers, collectors, and auctions. 58 It allowed some flexibility, with some regulation, for Member States
implementing their own droit de suite, such as giving the Member
State authority to set the threshold resale price,5 what percent royalty, and how the collection of the royalty would be managed.6 °
Since January 1, 2010, the date that the Directive required full implementation of a resale royalty by its Member States, this is now a
6
part of national laws across Europe. 1
On February 17, 2014, The EU Commissioner for Internal
Market and Services, issued "Key Principles and Recommendations in the Management of Author Resale Right" which provided
recommendations to help solve the transparency issue and various
administrative problems Europe has experienced with implementing droit de suite.62 Representatives of collection agencies, artists,
and art market professionals signed this document in order to better facilitate the solutions of these problems. 63 The "Key Principles and Recommendations in the Management of Author Resale
Right" proposed that participating parties, all collective management organizations administering droit de suite to artists, cooperate by sharing information with one another, in order to increase
transparency. 64 It also recommended to increase the understanding
57 Council Directive2001/84/ECof the European Parliamentand of the Council
of 27 September 2001 on the Resale Right for the Benefit of the Author of an
Original Work ofArt, Art. 1(2), 34.
58

1Id. at Art. 1.

59 Council Directive 2001/84/ECof the EuropeanParliamentand of the Council
of 27 September 2001 on the Resale Right for the Benefit of the Author of an

Original Work ofArt, Art. 3(2), 35. This right is whether the threshold price for
a resale royalty would be less than the maximum C3000 set up by the European
Commission.

60 Id. at Arts. 4(2)-(3), 6(2).
61Id. at Art. 8(2)-(3).

62 See Resale Right, Press Release Database, Copyright: Representatives of the
European art market commit to improving how the author resale right is managed, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseMEX-140214 en.htm. (Feb. 14, 2014).
63

id.

64 Key Principles and Recommendations on the management of the Author Resale Right, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 3 (Feb. 17, 2014) available at
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and overall awareness of the resale right for all parties involved by
organizing seminars, and providing inpublishing clear guidelines,
65
buyers.
to
formation
3. The UnitedKingdom
The United Kingdom is the third largest global art-market
and the largest European Union market. 66 The UK began its implementation of a droit de suite in 2006 with legislation that applied only to living artists. 67 It then expanded this right to estates
and heirs of deceased artists in 2012.68 The UK actually opted to
have a lower threshold price for a resale royalty of C1000, compared to the European Commission's suggested of C3000.69 After
implementing its own droit de suite, the UK's Intellectual Property
Office ("IPO") conducted a study in 2008 to determine whether
the resale royalty had an effect on the UK's art market. 70 It concluded that, "the art market in the UK, either despite or because of
the introduction of [droit de suite], appears to be doing well.'
Although this study was conducted when the resale royalty only
applied to living artists, the report found no evidence that the art
market was leaving the UK because of the implementation of droit

http://ec.europa.eu/internalmarket/copyright/docs/resale/ 140214-resale-rightkey-principles-and-recommendations en.pdf
65 Id. at 4-5
66 McAndrew at 23.
67 Artist's Resale Right Regulations, 2006, S.I. 346, Explanatory Note, Reg. 17,
at
available
(U.K.),
10
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2006/346/contents/made.
68 Artist's Resale Right (Amendment) Regulations, 2009, S.I. 2792, art. 2
at
available
(U.K.),
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2009/2792/pdfs/uksi_20092792_en.pdf
69 Artist's Resale Right Regulations, 2006, Reg. 12(3)(b), 4; Council Directive
2001/84/EC of the European Parliamentand of the Council of 27 September
2001 on the Resale Right for the Benefit of the Author of an Original Work of
Art, Art. 3(2), 35.
70 USCO Resale Royalty Report at 15.
71 Kathryn Graddy, Noah Horowitz, & Stefan Szymanski, A Study Into The Effect On The UK Art Market Of The Introduction Of The Artist's Resale Right,
at
available
(2008),
17
OFFICE,
PROPERTY
INTELLECTUAL
http://people.brandeis.edu/-kgraddy/government/ARRFinalnc.pdf
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de suite.72 Tania Spriggens, a member of the UK's Design and
Artists Copyright Society, commented on this 2008 study:
The art market has fluctuated enormously since
2006. In fact, in 2007, it grew astronomically huge.
There was a massive bubble, which subsequently
burst, that was nothing to do with the resale right.
And all the evidence we've seen is that, lots of fac73
tors affect the art market, not the resale right.
In its 2008 study, the United Kingdom's Intellectual Property Offices found that the Artist's Resale Right did not "divert
business away from the UK." In fact, the UK's art market size has
increased at a faster rate than other markets.
During the summer of 2014, the UK's Intellectual Property
Office ("IPO") conducted a survey of professionals in the art market in order to find empirical evidence of the effect of the artist's
resale right ("ARR") on the UK art market. 74 This survey also focused on the lower payment band of artists (those who sell artwork
valued from

C1000-3000) 75

to determine whether the ARR was

affecting lower income artists. 76 The survey analyzed forty-three
responses from art galleries, art dealers, auction houses, and the
two collecting agencies that collect the royalties from ARR - Artists' Collecting Society (ACS) and Design and Artists Copyright
Society (DACS).77 This is the most recent, comprehensive survey
on the effects of the ARR on those present in the British art market. Two thirds of the participants reported that the ARR applied
to less than 25% of their art sales and that most of their sales that
ARR applied to were above C3000.78
72

1d. at2.

73 Resale Royalty Public Round

Table, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, (April 23,

2013) at 17.

74 Artist's Resale Right

- Summary of Survey Findings, INTELLECTUAL
1,
(2015)
available
at
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachmentdata
/file/375378/artists-resale-rights-ipo-survey.pdf.
7'
The survey used Euros as currency.
76
id.
77 id.
78
id.
PROPERTY

OFFICE,
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4. France

France was the first country to officially implement droit
de suite on May 20, 1920. 79 This law was enacted as an addition
to its copyright law, which some believed was inadequate in protecting artists.8g This law allowed visual artists to be on an "equal
economic footing" as other artists, such as composers and writers,
by creating a resale royalty right for visual artists, which the other
artists already enjoyed .8 Artists could receive a percentage of the
sales price, depending on the price, each time their original artwork was resold at a public auction.8 2 In 1957, a new law was enacted and changed the fixed percentage to three percent, no matter
the resale price of the artwork, in order to simplify collecting the
royalty.8 3 The resale royalty right only applies to artwork resold at
a public auction. Marie-Anne Ferry-Fall, member of Socit6 des
Auters dans les Arts Graphiques et Plastiques, stated,
In France, it's the highest author's right and it's
very, very important for an artist to follow the career of their works and to receive something for the
auctioneers who make money, and that's a good
with their works and
thing, but they make money
84
it.
of
benefit
artists must

This shows that France continues to find this moral right crucial
for its artists.

79 USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 4; see also Carole M. Vickers, The Applicability of the Droit de Suite in the United States, 3 B.C. INT'L & COMp. L. REv.
433, 438, n.16 (1980).
0
ld. at 438.
81Vickers at 438.
82 The artist would receive one percent of the sales price if the artwork was resold for 50-10,000 francs, one and a half percent if the artwork was resold for
10,000-20,000 francs, two percent if the artwork was resold for 20,000-50,000
francs, and three percent if the artwork was resold for over 50,000 francs. Id. at
438, n.20.
83 Id. at 439, n.23.
84 Resale Royalty Public Round Table at 36-37.
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5. Australia
When implementing their own resale royalty bill in 2009,
Australian Minister for the Environment, Heritage and the Arts observed: "[h]istorically, the achievements of our visual artists have
not been recognized to the same extent as those of our composers,
authors and performers . . . . [T]his bill[] addresses a situation
which is plainly inequitable." 85 The Resale Royalty Right for Visual Artists Act provides artists with a 5% royalty on sales over
$1,000 AUD.8 6 This resale right, however, only lasts for the life of
the artist plus seventy years. 87 Sellers of the art have a ninety day
limit to report, in writing, the resale with enough information that a
collection agency can distribute the possible royalty. 88 What
makes this bill unique is that it is prospective and no royalty is due
in the first sale if a work was acquired before the bill took effect
and resold; only subsequent sales will qualify for the resale royal9
8

ty.

Similar to the United States, before implementing the bill,
the Australian parliament requested a report to analyze potential
impacts and whether there was support for the bill. 90 The Australian Copyright Council first supported an Australian droit de suite
in 1989 and the Australian Report showed prevalent support for its
implementation, especially to better protect Indigenous visual artists and their rights in the market. 9 1 With the support of the Australia Report, the droit de suite was implemented in Australia in
June 2010.
85 Copyright AgencyiViscopy, Comments Submitted in Response to U.S. Copyright Office's Sept. 19, 2012 Notice of Inquiry at 3 (Dec. 2012).
86 Resale Royalty Right for Visual Artists Act 2009, No. 125 (Austl.),
§§
10(1)(a), 18, availableat http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2009A00 125.
87 Resale Royalty Right for Visual Artists Act 2009 at §32.
8

Id.at §28.

89

1d. at § 11.

90 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Climate Change, Water,
Environment and the Arts, Resale Royalty Right for Visual Artists Bill 2008
("Australia Report"), 2 (Feb. 2009).
91Id. at 41;see also Rupert Myer, Commonwealth Of Australia, Report Of The
Contemporary Visual Arts and Craft Inquiry 82 (June 14, 2002) ("Myer Report"),
http://arts.gov.aulsites/default/fi
les/pdfs/Report of theContemporaryVisualArts and Craft _Inquiry.pdf.
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In 2013, the Australian government published a comprehensive review of its droit de suite bill. In its corresponding disart
cussion paper, the Australian government received input from
92
The
market professionals, artists, and visual arts organizations.
paper reported that as of its publication, 26 percent or artwork that
was being resold was eligible for the royalty, 91 percent of royalties distributed were to living artists, and the majority of royalties
being received by artists valued between $51-$500. 9" This shows
for the resale of their
that Australian artists are receiving royalties
94
end.
high
the
at
only
not
and
artwork
D. CurrentPolicy and Law in the USA: Attempts to Introduce
Droit de Suite
1. HistoricalEfforts in the USA
The United States has unsuccessfully attempted to implement droit de suite legislation many times in the past. After signing the Berne Convention in 1928, the United States did not seriously consider droit de suite legislation until 1973 when the artist
Robert Rauschenberg's 1958 painting "Thaw" was sold at auction.95 Rauschenberg initially sold his painting for $900, but when
it was resold in 1973 for $85,000, Rauschenberg did not receive
any royalties for this sale.96 This seems to be unjust for artists because they are not only not able to benefit in the same ways as other artists, but they possibly could economically lose due to unfair
92

Review of the Resale Royalty Scheme, Discussion Paperand Terms of Refer-

ence, OFFICE FOR THE ARTS, DEPARTMENT OF REGIONAL AUSTRALIA, LOCAL

1 (June 2013) available at
2 2
2
http://arts.gov.au/sites/default/files/visualarts/Discussion%20Paper% 0% 0 01
3%20Review%20of/o2OResale%2ORoyalty%2OScheme.pdf.
93 Review of the Resale Royalty Scheme, Discussion Paper and Terms of ReferGOVERNMENT,

ARTS

AND

SPORT,

ence, OFFICE FOR THE ARTS, DEPARTMENT OF REGIONAL AUSTRALIA, LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, ARTS AND SPORT at 4.
94 If the majority of artists are receiving

between $51-$500, or 5% of the resale
value, these artworks were sold between $1,020-$10,000.
95 USCO Resale Royalty Report at 6.
96 Id, see Patricia Cohen, Artists File Lawsuits, Seeking Royalties, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 1, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/02/arts/design/artists-file-suitagainst-sothebys-christies-and-ebay.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
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practices in the secondary market. Rauschenberg began fighting
for droit de suite rights for artists after this event. 97 According to
his son, Christopher Rauschenberg, his father's "hard work was
beginning to pay off, but not for him." 9 8 What he meant by this
was that the auction house benefitted from the increase in value of
the painting, due to the hard work of Robert Rauschenberg over
the past fifteen years, and not the artist himself. "Implementing
legislation that equitably distributes the proceeds of creative output
will cost taxpayers absolutely
nothing, yet would mean a great deal
99
community."
to the artistic
Previous attempts have been made to implement resale
royalty rights for visual artists in the United States. In 1978, Representative Henry Waxman introduced the Visual Artist Residual
Rights Act of 1978 ("Waxman Bill") during the 95 th Congress
proposing that a visual artist would receive a 5% royalty on a resale over $1000.100 Part of the proposal required the work to be
registered with the National Commission on the Visual Arts,
which would regulate and distribute the royalties. 10 1 This was a
prospective right applying only to resale that occurred one year after the installation of the Waxman Bill.'0 2 In 1986, Senator Edward Kennedy proposed the unsuccessful Visual Artists Rights
Amendment of 1986, providing that visual artists receive 7% of
the difference between the sales price and the purchase price when
it was resold for over $5000.103 The next year, the Visual Artist
Rights Act of 1978 (the "Kennedy-Markey Bill") was proposed by
Senator Kennedy asking for a 7% royalty for works of art sold for
$1000 that were registered with the U.S. Copyright Office. 104 During the hearings for this bill, Representative Edward Markey stated

97

id.

98 Christopher Rauschenberg, Artists Deserve Royalties Too, HUFFINGTON POST
(July 15, 2014) available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/christopherrauschenberg/artists-deserve-royaities b 5588388.html.
99 Christopher Rauschenberg, Artists Deserve Royalties Too, HUFFINGTON POST.
100 Visual Artists' Residual Rights Act of 1978, H.R. 11403, 95th Cong. (1978).
101 H.R. 11403 §§ 3(a), 5(c), (1978).
1021d at § 8.
103 Visual Artists Rights Amendment of 1986, S. 2796, 99th Cong. (1986).
104 visual Artists Rights Act of 1987, S. 1619, 100th Cong. §§ 3, 8 (1987).
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the right to participate economically in the
that visual artists "need
05
work."'
the
of
success
2. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA)
The United States finally joined the Berne Convention
when Congress executed the Berne Convention Implementation
Act in 1988."' The United States' main motivation in implementing this Act was to gain more international intellectual property
protection,' 0 7 rather than promoting American artists' rights.'0 8 In
order to comply with the Berne Convention, the United States
needed to enact some form of federal moral rights legislation. 0 9
Despite opposition to federal moral rights, Congress passed the
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, but only after removing the resale right provision. 110 This amendment of the 1976 Copyright
Act is narrowly defined to apply to visual artwork 1 ' that would
otherwise be eligible for copyright protection."12 The only mention of resale royalties for visual rights in VARA was the request
for the Copyright Office to organize a study on the feasibility of
success of future resale royalty legislation.1 13 The implementation
of VARA was the first step in granting visual artists additional
rights in the United States, but, compared to the rest of the world,
105The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1987: Hearings on S. 1619 Before the Sub-

comm. On Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. On the
Judiciary, 100th Cong. 15(1987).
106 Patty Gerstenblith, Art, CulturalHeritage,and the Law: Cases and Materials
174 (Carolina Academic Press, 3rd ed. 2012).
107

This may have been due to the increase in computer software during the time

of the Act's implementation. Gerstenblith, 174.
108 Id.

109

Article 6bis of the Berne Convention states:
(1) Independently of the author's economic rights, and even
after the transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the
right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation, or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honour or reputation.

110 USCO Resale Royalty Report at 7.
"'1

This cannot be a work made for hire. 17 U.S.C. § 101

112 17 U.S.C. § 101
113 id.
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it is lacking. VARA grants very limited moral rights to artists, including the right of attribution and integrity, is limited to the dura114
tion of the artist's life, and may be waived by the artist.
3. Register of Copyrights 'Report on Resale Royalties of 1992
When the Copyright Office published its comprehensive
report, requested by the implementation of VARA in 1992, it concluded that it was "not persuaded that sufficient economic and
copyright policy justification exists" to have resale royalties in the
United States. 1 5 In the report, the Copyright Office expressed its
concern that implementing a droit de suite in the United States
could harm visual artists because it would decrease profits from
the primary market to compensate for economic gain in future
6 The
sales. 11
report also suggested that United States should wait
until more members of the European communities granted droit de
suite before deciding whether resale royalties should be implemented to harmonize with Europe. 17 At the time of the report, only thirty-six countries had implemented a droit de suite, whereas
today, over seventy countries, including the entire European Union, have implemented this right. 118 Presently, Europe has acted
with droit de suite and the United States has a justified reason to
implement it itself because the European Union harmonized its
droit de suite laws. 119 If the United States implemented a droit de
suite, not only would it become more harmonized with Europe, but
also American artists could receive royalties when selling their
works abroad through reciprocity.

I14
17 U.S.C. §§ 106A(a), (d), (e).

115 Droit De Suite: The Artist's Resale Royalty, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, xv

(Dec. 1992), availableat http://www.copyright.gov/history/droit-de-suite.pdf.
"'6Id. at 133.
117Id. at 149.

l.8Id. at xi, 149.
119 Lehman, Resale Royalties Round Table, pg. 159; see USCO Resale Royalty
Report, pg. 13.
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4. Legal Concerns with a Droitde Suite
Implementing a droit de suite in the United States raises
potential legal and Constitutional issues because a droit de suite
potentially interferes with an individual's bundle of property
rights. Critics have argued that a resale royalty in the United States
violates both the First Sale Doctrine as well as constitutes as a
Fifth Amendment regulatory taking.
a. FirstSale Doctrine
Some critics of a resale royalty bill believe it would interfere with the First Sale Doctrine of the Copyright Act. This doctrine gives the right to the purchaser of a lawfully produced copy
of a copyrighted work to dispose of it as he or she wishes without
120
Critics of a droit
permission from the original copyright owner.
de suite in the United States believe that implementing this right
would violate this doctrine by preventing buyers of the artwork
2
from ever obtaining complete title over the artwork.' ' Supporters
argue that a droit de suite would not violate the First Sale Doctrine
because a resale royalty only requires payment when the artwork is
1 22
The
resold and does not prevent the free transfer or property.
current owner of the artwork would not be prevented by a resale
royalty from reselling the work of art freely because the droit de
be considered more of a tax instead of a property resuite would
12 3
striction.

120

17 U.S.C.

§109(a) - Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106 (3), the

owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of
the possession of that copy or phonorecord.
121 USCO, Resale Royalties: An Updated Analysis, at 58 (Dec. 2013); see also
Christie's, Inc. & Sotheby's, Inc., Comments Submitted in Response to U.S.
Copyright Office's Sept. 19, 2012 Notice of Inquiry re Resale Royalty Right at
7 (Dec. 5, 2012).
122 USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 58.
123 USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 58.
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b. Fifth Amendment ConstitutionalIssues: Regulatory Taking
A droit de suite in the United States raises concerns regarding Fifth Amendment property rights, specifically the takings
clause. These concerns are raised in conjunction with whether a resale royalty can be applied retroactively to the resale of works of
art that were purchased from an artist before the implementation of
the droit de suite.114 If the droit de suite was implemented retroactively, it could negatively affect the bundle of property rights that
are granted to Americans, especially the right of alienation. When
the current purchaser bought the work of art, he or she relied on
the First Sale Doctrine; when purchasing the artwork, the purchaser gained ownership interest in the physical object and the artist
would no longer have this interest. 125 If, however, the artist can
now instill a royalty requirement on the purchaser, this potentially
destroys the alienability right of the purchaser.
Having a governmental regulation interfere with an indi26
vidual's property rights could be considered a regulatory taking. 1
A regulatory taking is a fact-specific inquiry by balancing the economic impact of the regulation, its interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action. 127 A resale royalty could have a significant
''economic impact" on some parties because of the amount
of the
royalty to be paid to the artist. This could be to a lessened degree if
there is a cap on the amount of royalty the artist could receive. 128 If
a resale royalty were to be enacted retroactively, this could affect
someone's "reasonable investment-backed expectation."' 129 A collector who purchased a work of art could not have had a reasonable expectation that the purchased artwork would now be worth
less when resold because an artist would be entitled to a percentage of the sales.' 30 This could severely burden the buyer's "in124 USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 60.
125 17 U.S.C. § 109.
26 As compared to a per se taking which requires
a permanent physical occupation of someone's property. See Loretto v. Manhattan Teleprompter CATV
Corp, 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
127 Penn Central Transp. Co v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
1281Id. at 124; USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 62.
129 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
130 USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 62.
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vestment-backed expectations" of his or her property. An opposing
argument is that if the value of property is reduced, this is the same
as a taking of the property.1 31 The "character of the government
action" could lean towards either party's favor.' 32 Supporters of a
resale royalty could argue that droit de suite is so prevalent around
the rest of the world and it is directed at a very limited group of
people, that this government action could not be considered extraordinary. 33 Those who oppose a droit de suite could argue that
placing a burden on someone's physical property is a mass departure from the established beliefs of property rights. 134 The Penn
Central test can certainly weigh in either side's favor; thus the outcome of whether a droit de suite would be considered a regulatory
taking cannot be accurately predicted.
5. CaliforniaResale Royalties Act
In 1976, California enacted the California Resale Royalties
Act (the "CRRA"): the only resale royalty legislation that has
passed in the United States. 35 This act applies to sales by both private dealers and public auctions.' 36 The CRRA provides that
"[w]henever a work of fine art is sold and the seller resides in California or the sale takes place in California, the seller or the seller's
agent shall pay to the artist of such work of fine art or to such artist's agent 5 percent of the amount of such sale."' 137 Before payment of a royalty, the CRRA imposes several conditions which
must first be satisfied. 13 8 The CRRA also provides that the seller's
agent must pay the resale royalty to the artist, specifically, "[w]hen
a work of fine art is sold at an auction or by a gallery, dealer, broAndrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979).
Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
133USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 62-63.
134 USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 62.
135USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 20.
136 Vickers, at 445.
137 Cal. Civ. Code § 986(a)
138 (1) The artist must be a U.S. or California citizen for at least two years; (2)
131

132 Penn

the sale must take place in or the seller must reside in California; (3) the work
must satisfy the conditions of being a work of fine art according to California
law; (4) the work must be sold for a profit; and (5) the work must be sold for
$1,000 or greater. See Cal. Civ. Code § 986.
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ker, museum, or other person acting as the agent for the seller the
agent shall withhold 5 percent of the amount of the sale, locate the
artist and pay the artist."' 39 The agent has 90 days to locate the artist to pay the 5 percent royalty; if it is unable to find the artist during this time frame, it must pay the royalty to the California Arts
Council who then has seven years to find the artist or the funds
will be used by the California Arts Council for "use in acquiring
fine art.', 140 Finally, if the agent does not provide the artist with the
royalty, the artist may "bring an action for damages within three
years after the date of sale141or one year after the discovery of the
sale, whichever is longer."
Many issues went unaddressed with this act. First, the California Resale Royalties Act did not have a requirement to publically disclose sales information. This is problematic because if the
sales are not publically disclosed, artists and the collection agencies may not be aware that their artwork was resold. 142 Although
unlikely, this could be a disincentive for a dealer to inform the artist of the resale, thus preventing the dealer from losing money with
the resale royalty. Another possible issue is that artist may not
want to bring an action if the artist is not paid. A seller is often not
a stranger to the artist and many artists may fear jeopardizing their
careers if they lose the relationship with this seller. 143 Another enforcement problem could have arisen in connection to the provision that the droit de suite terminates upon the artist's death and
would not apply to a work of art whose resale price is less than the
original purchase price.144 A dishonest seller could sell artwork by
both living and dead artists as a bundle to a buyer with the artwork
by the deceased artist overpriced and the artwork by the living art45
ist underpriced, thus avoiding the resale royalty.1
This act has not gone unchallenged since its enactment,
with two major court decisions concerning preemption by federal
139Cal. Civ. Code § 986(a)(1).

Cal. Civ. Code § 986(a)(3), (a)(5).
Civ. Code § 986(a)(3).
142 Vickers, at 446.
140

141 Cal.
143 id.

144The resale royalty shall not apply to "the a resale after the death of such art-

ist" and "to the resale of the work of fin art for a gross sales price less than the
purchase price paid by the seller." Cal. Civ. Code §§ 986(l)(b)(3)-(4).
145 Vickers, at 446.
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copyright law. In Morseburgv. Balyon, an art dealer brought suit
to avoid paying royalties claiming federal copyright law preempted the CRRA. 14 6 The Ninth Circuit held on appeal that since the
transaction occurred prior to the Copyright Act of 1976, the Copyright Act of 1909 did not preempt CRRA. 147 This was the first of
many suits challenging the validity of the CRRA.
The CRRA was challenged and held invalid in Estate of
Graham v. Sotheby's Inc. 148 The Plaintiffs, agents of California
sellers, claimed Sotheby's had sold their artwork at a New York
auction, but did not pay the CRRA's required royalty. 149 Sotheby's
replied that the CRRA violated the Constitution's Commerce
Clause because it "regulate[d] transactions that [took] place wholly
outside of California."' 150 When looking at the CRRA's legislative
history, the court noted that the California legislature discussed
and ultimately rejected the royalty only applying to in-state sales
due to the fear that the art market would leave California in order
to avoid paying the royalty.151 The court found that artwork constitutes a "thing" in interstate commerce when an artwork is sold
from one state to another, thus falling under Congress' power from
the Commerce Clause.' 52 The court also found the CRRA "substantially affected" interstate commerce because the statute had to
do with "commerce or any sort of economic enterprise, however
broadly one might define those terms."' 153 The Central District
Court of California held that the CRRA had the "effect of controlling commerce occurring wholly outside the boundaries of California" thus in violation of the Commerce Clause by interrupting
the federal government's right to control commerce between
states. 154 Despite having a severability clause in its text, the court
found the CRRA invalid not only because it violated the Commerce Clause but also the California legislature would not have
Morseburg v. Balyon, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18831, at *1 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
Morseburg v. Baylon, 621 F.2d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 1980).
Estate of Graham v. Sotheby's Inc., 860 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
Id. at 1119.
150 Id. at 1120; see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8,cl. 3.
"S!Estate of Graham, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 1126.
152 Id. at 1123; see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59; 115 S.Ct.
146
147
148
149

1624,
1629 (1995).
153
Id. at 1123, quotingLopez, 514 U.S. at 561; 115 S.Ct. 1624.
114 Estate of Graham, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 1124-25.
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enacted the CRRA
if it only applied to transactions occurring with55
in California.
California has had extreme difficulty in the enforcement of
the CRAA. Many dealers and parties in sales are not complying
with these new rules. According to a New York Times article, since
the enactment of the CRRA, only around 400 artists have received
royalties in amounts totaling $328,000."' In addition to the noncompliance, the California Arts Council struggled with administering the royalties; BALA reported that the California Arts Council
was holding $13,435 in royalties for artists whose locations could
not be found. 15 7 Due to these inconsistencies, it is extremely difficult to see the effects, whether positive or negative, the CRRA has
had on individual artists and the art market.
6. Equity for Visual Artists Act of 2011 (EVAA)
In 2011, Representative Nadler, as well as Wisconsin
Democratic Senator Herb Kohl, introduced the Equity for Visual
Artists Act of 2011 (the "EVAA") which proposed collecting a 7
percent royalty if a visual artist's artwork was resold at auction for
at least $10,000.158 This 7 percent of the sale price would be accumulated by a collecting society and split between the artist and
an escrow account created to support a nonprofit museum in the
United States. 159 The money given to the museum would promote
its further collecting of artworks.' 60 This bill failed as Representative Nadler was unable to gain any cosponsors, and it was never
voted on after the 1 1 2th Congress finished in 2012.161

155 The extraterritorial reach could not be severed from the bill, thus the entire
bill had to be struck down. Id. at 1126.

156

Patricia Cohen, Artists File Lawsuits, Seeking Royalties, N.Y. TIMES, (Nov.

1,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/02/arts/design/artists-file-suita Tainst-sothebys-christies-and-ebay.html?pagewanted=all.
USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 23.
158 See Equity for Visual Artists Act of 2011, H.R. 3688, 112th Cong. (2011), §

2, ("EVAA").
59
'
160

EVAA § 3.
EVAA § 3.
161 EVAA Co-Sponsors, available at https://www.congress.govibill/l
12thcongress/house-bill/3688/cosponsors
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7. Resale Royalties: An UpdatedAnalysis from the Office of the
Register of Copyrights
In December 2013, the United States Copyright Office released its "Resale Royalties: An Updated Analysis" where it compiled its findings since it released the 1992 report. After analyzing
the many positive and negative aspects of having a droitde suite in
the United States, the report found that many artists in the United
States are disadvantaged compared to other authors, such as literary or musical, due to the structure of the current copyright system. 16 2 The Copyright Office acknowledged that the lack of data
available on this topic did prevent it from making a definitive conclusion about droit de suite in the United States, but it did recognize that the data it did have showed that visual artists could not
benefit in the same way as other artists due to the fact that visual
art is not commonly distributed in copies, as are other forms of
art.' 63 The nature of visual art limits an artist's financial gain. The
Copyright Office urged Congress to consider ways to resolve this
problem by finding solutions to encourage visual artists to continue their craft. Although over seventy countries have adopted resale
royalty legislation, the Copyright Office believed that there may be
other, more effective, ways of accomplishing these goals. Since
there is a significant lack of information, the Copyright Office cautioned about the actual effect a droit de suite would have on United States' artists.1 64 The Copyright Office concluded by indicating
that it does support resale royalty legislation, but it is also important to explore other options such as voluntary initiatives or encouragement. It cautioned Congress that if it does propose a droit
de suite, it must be advantageous to the greatest number of artists
while, most importantly, posing the least disturbance on the art
market.165 It also raised the consideration of waiting to implement
resale royalty legislation until even more data can be collected and
the effect can be further studied. 166 This is very similar to the end
recommendations of the 1992 report, which suggested waiting un162

USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 65.

163 Id.

164id.
165 Id. at
66

1

66.

id.
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til further empirical data was collected. There may never be adequate information to decide whether a droit de suite is feasible in
the United States.
III. ECONOMIC DISCUSSION OF DROITDE SUITE
A. How a Resale Royalty May Affect the Overall Market - An
Economic Approach
Although there is a lack of empirical data regarding the art
market and the potential effects of a droit de suite, an economic
analysis can be conducted. A resale royalty can be treated as an
excise tax. An excise tax is a governmental tax on the sale, use, or
production of certain commodities or services,1 67 and can be included in the price of the product. 168 Even though there is little data on the effect of droit de suite on the art market, performing an
elasticity analysis can be instructive. The economic issue that
needs to be explored is the demand curve's elasticity 169 for works
of art that have a resale royalty.170 If the demand curve for artwork
subject to a droit de suite is elastic, then the total amount of money
flowing into the secondary art market will decrease. According to
economic theory, if the secondary art market decreases, it will also
affect the primary art market with a depressive effect. 171 Some factors that would affect the art market's elasticity include the price
position of the product on the demand curve, the availability of
substitutes, and how much of the consumer's income the purchase
of this product represents. 172 Therefore, if any of these factors can
be easily influenced by the change in price, it would make the demand curve more elastic. This can be easily done since the price of
an artwork can be high, thus a purchaser spending a high percentage of his income on the artwork, and there could be suitable sub67

Cengage Learning, pg 46.
A common example is an excise tax on the sale of tobacco or gasoline.
169 Elasticity is how sensitive the demand curve is to a certain
independent vari1

BRIEF ACCOUNTING DICTIONARY, EXCISE TAX,

168

able, usually the change in price. MICHAEL R. BAYE, MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS
AND BUSINESS STRATEGY 75 (McGraw-Hill International Edition, 7th Ed).
170 Vickers,

171
172

at 459-60.
Vickers, at 460.
Id.
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stitutes of artwork that are not affected by droit de suite. Therefore, this basic economic analysis shows that a droit de suite renders the demand curve for the art market more elastic and a resale
royalty could likely harm both the secondary and primary art markets.17 3 Additionally, in an economic application the resale royalty
acts as a discriminatory tax, and could result in the market viewing
artwork subject to a resale royalty as a poor investment.
1. Incentive to CreateNew Works
One of the major purposes of copyright law is to promote
creativity by protecting an artist's work. 174 A resale royalty right
could support this copyright goal, therefore justifying the legislation. Although other countries may not emphasize the promotion
of creativity as does the United States, it is still equally important
to protect artists' rights, specifically through droit de suite.175 Artists could have an additional financial benefit from a resale royalty, further promoting creativity by allowing them to maintain their
artistic careers.' 76 Even if the royalty is minimal, it is still additional revenue that an artist could use to promote his craft. 177 Not
only could living artists benefit from this additional revenue, but it
could also have a positive effect on post mortem benefits. A droit
de suite for a piece of visual art by an artist who has passed away
could allow his heirs to benefit financially. This idea could motivate artists to not only create art, but to excel and have a positive
reputation in the art world, which would benefit their heirs post
number of sales, and thus a higher amount of
mortem with a higher
78
resale royalties.

173 id.
174

See U.S. CONST. art. I, §8.

USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 36-37.
Id. at 37.
177 The increased revenue could be used for supplies, studio space, or other
working expenses that artists encounter during their craft. By allowing artists to
have better access to these expenses, it helps fulfill the Constitutional provision
of copyright.
178 USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 37. See. American Society of Illustrators
Partnership ("ASIP"), Comments Submitted in Response to U.S. Copyright Office's Sept. 19, 2012 Notice of Inquiry at 2 ("ASIP Comments").
175

176
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Critics of resale royalties contend that a droit de suite
would not motivate artists to create more artwork. They argue that
visual artists create art based on their own personal inspiration, not
whether they will receive economic compensation from creation. 179 As Throphile Gautier stated, artists create "art for art's sake."'180 Another criticism of droit de suite is that dealers may be
unwilling to invest long term in younger artists beginning their careers knowing that they will have increased transaction costs later.
As one dealer in the United Kingdom said:
It is not encouraging us to deal with less established
artists that is certain, it definitely impacts on my
ability to speculate on riskier artists. I want to support young artists but this discourages my interest
in doing so, it is not that I don't want to help them
but I am less likely now to purchase outright at an
early stage in the artist's career. 181
Dealers frequently purchase young, up-and-coming artists'
works prior to exhibitions as an investment; these risky investments often do not yield initial returns.1 82 With the possibility of a
droit de suite, the price of these young artist's works would have
to increase in order for dealers to make a profit. Dealers have argued that the increase in price may be unattractive to prospective
buyers; if the dealers know there will be greater difficulty selling
these works, they will be less likely to invest in these artists initially. 183

Many considerations must be assessed when analyzing
whether a resale royalty will promote the purposes of copyright.
The majority of the speculations on whether a resale royalty would
increase creativity are not supported by solid evidence. 8 4 These
79

' Id. at 38.

In French, "L'art pour l'art."
Toby Froschauer, The Impact Of Artist Resale Rights On The Art Market In
The
United Kingdom,
LAPADA, 19
(2008),
available at
http://www.lapada.org/public/Impact StudybyTobyFroschauer.pdf.
180

181

182 Id.

USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 38.
Kal Raustiala & Christopher Jon Sprigman, Artist Resale Royalties: Do They
Help or Hurt?, FREAKONOMICS (Dec. 22, 2011), available at
183
184
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statements are speculative and may even be the result of an overconfidence bias where individuals have the belief that they possess
some unique trait or ability that allows them to overcome odds,
whereas others do not have this trait. This extreme optimism gives
it is unlikely to know if
skewed support for a droitde suite because
185
creativity.
promote
fact,
in
will,
this
2. The PrimaryArt Market
Due to the difficulty in obtaining information about the
primary art market, it is problematic to accurately analyze how a
droit de suite in the United States would affect the primary art
market. 186 Not only does the United States have difficulties assessing the future consequences of a droit de suite, but other countries worldwide, even those who have implemented a resale royalty, have encountered problems empirically analyzing the droit de
suite. For example, Australia posed questions about how a resale
royalty would affect their primary art market in a report corresponding with their resale royalty bill in 2008.187 In its government's review of the bill five years later, these questions still had
not been sufficiently answered because they could not deduce the
effect due to the lack of sufficient data to even extrapolate results. 18 8 This lack of primary art market transparency is trouble-

some if the United States wishes to implement a droit de suite, because a lack of data
Droit de suite critics have argued that a resale royalty cannot survive a simple supply and demand analysis. Critics argue
that collectors who will not buy artwork because of the resale royalty will decrease demand, but the supply of art will not increase.
This could cause prices to go down, due to the inverse nature of
supply and demand. Moreover, collectors may demand reduced
prices in the primary market in order to compensate for potential

http://freakonomics.com/2011/1 2/22/artist-resale-royalties-do-they-help-or-

hurt/.
185 Id.

186 USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 42.
187 Australia Report, at 34.
188 Australia 2013 Review, at 6.
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royalties in the secondary market.189 This would have a deleterious
effect on artists' payments in the primary market.
Critics of a resale royalty in the United States have stated
that its implementation may prevent buyers from purchasing art on
the primary art market. It is important to note that many art collectors buy art not because of its price. People collect art for a variety
of reasons, including the obvious reason of actually enjoying the
art for its visual and symbolic appeal. Many purchase art for its
aesthetics and not as an investment. 90 Although some collectors
may base their purchases on whether there is a resale royalty or
not, it is important to realize that this may not be the primary reason to make a purchase.
Unless more quantitative data is made available in the primary art market, it will be nearly impossible to conclude whether
the primary art market will be affected by a droit de suite. Major
legislative decisions cannot be made because of lack of data and
because of speculations on how a droit de suite would affect the
primary market. These decisions are made even more difficult not
because the data is not present, it is because the data is unlikely to
be discovered in the primary art market.
3. The SecondaryArt Market
Droit de suite is a concept involving the secondary art
market. The secondary art market is where artwork is resold, primarily through auction houses and private dealers. 19 1 There is limited information about the economics of the secondary market in
order to protect the privacy of purchasers, but not to the same extent as the primary market. 192 Supporters and those opposed to a
resale royalty disagree on a droit de suite's effect on this market
for many of the same reasons regarding resale royalties and their
effects on the primary market. Multiple factors that are often ab189 USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 44.

190 Shira Perlmutter, Resale Royalties for Artists: An Analysis of the Register of
Copyrights'Report.16 COLUM.-VLA J.L & ARTS 395. 408 (1991-1992).
191 New or Secondhand? The ins and outs of primary and secondary markets,
THE
ECONOMIST
(Nov.
26,
2009).
Available
at
http://www.economist.com/node/14941173.
192 USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 46.
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sent in the primary art market impact and shape the secondary art
markets. These include commissions, advances, insurance fees,
fees.' 93
third-party guarantees, and storage and transportation
Many more influences affect the secondary art market, rendering it
difficult to deduce the impact of a resale royalty.
Again, proponents believe that the increased incentive to
create will cause artists to produce more work, eventually having a
positive effect on the secondary art market.1 94 They argue that the
increased administrative costs in enforcing a resale royalty will be
of minimal concern because buyers and sellers in the secondary art
market already experience a significant amount of transaction
costs. 195 These costs, such as buyer's premiums and fees for unsold art at auctions, have nothing to do with benefitting the artist
de suite.19 6
and are generally much higher than the proposed droit
If the threshold for the resale royalty is appropriate, the benefits of
the droit de suite are likely to outweigh the administrative costs of
compliance. 197
Those who oppose a resale royalty argue that by imposing
a droit de suite, the overall incentive to resell artwork may diminish, thus reducing the secondary art market. Again, the unavailability of information poses another problem. If critics argue a resale
royalty will decrease the secondary art market, it is extremely difficult to prove that droit de suite is the single factor that affects the
market.' A variety of other factors could lead to the secondary art
market's decrease, such as the changes in ways that collectors are
purchasing art, decrease in the supply of artwork, and changes in
taste in artwork. 19 9 In sum, it is impossible to determine that a resale royalty would destroy the secondary art market. As in the
primary art market, arguments by both supporters and opponents
are speculative.
Opponents fear that if the United States imposes a resale
royalty, the secondary market would leave the United States for
19' Id. at 56.
14 ld. at

46.
Olav Veltuis, Art Markets, A Handbook Of Cultural Economics, at 23-24.
196 USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 47.
'95

197 id.

198

Id. at 50.

'99 EC Report, at 7.
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other countries that do not have the droit de suite. As one of the
"global market hubs," the United States cannot afford to lose merchants.200 From an economic standpoint, merchants will sell commodities, such as art, where there are less transaction costs imposed on them. If a resale royalty adds to transaction costs, sellers
will take this into consideration when choosing locations to sell
their goods. 20 Again, it is uncertain whether art merchants' moves
from the United States to other countries are primarily due to a resale royalty. The UK did not record any noticeable changes in
merchants leaving the UK after they implemented a resale royalty. 20 Causality cannot be solely attributed to a droit de suite; a

correlation does not necessarily imply a cause-and-effect relationship. 0 3 The location of the secondary art market also depends on
many other factors such as public taste, the structure of the art
market, taxes, the availability of experts, and the ability to interest
consignors.2z 4
The efficacy of a droit de suite on the secondary market also may depend on the frequency that the artwork is resold. If the

200 According to the EC Report, a "global market hub" is a location where the
highest valued art transactions occur. These are the sales of artwork over
C50,000. EC Report, at 7.
201 EC Report, at 7-8.
202 UK Report at 16.
203 Commenting on the potential shift of transactions to countries without a droit
de suite, Gerhard Pfennig from VG Bild-Kunst stated, "we have often heard the
argument that sales would be shifted to other countries, to United States or
Switzerland, to Great Britain. The experience shows that even galleries from

Switzerland, where there is no resale royalty, moved to London... which shows
that t resale royalty, which they have to pay in London, doesn't have any affect
on these business developments because buyers come to London. This is the effect in Europe, most of the market goes to London, because there are the buyers." Resale Royalty Round Table, at 27-28.
204 See Consultation Preparatoire au Rapport de la Commission Europeenne
sur
la Mise en Oeuvre et les Effets de la Directive 2001/84/CE du Parlement Europeen et du conseil du 27 Septembre 2001 Relative au Droit de Suite au Profit de
l'Auteur d'une Oeuvre d'art Originale, 25 (May 2011), available at),
https://circabc.europa.eu/sd/d/5447f8e9-c 1e2-4d30-a4d612e5295 IObdf/Authorities of France.pdf.
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artwork is never resold, a resale royalty is not imposed. 205 An artist
may economically benefit more if his work is continually resold as
compared to an artist whose artwork does not resell as often. This
shows that success from a droit de suite may be more analogous to
the artwork's turnover than value based on the art market.2 °6 This
is an important consideration when deciding whether to institute a
resale royalty in the United States.
4. Changes in the Art Market
Although an' arguably broad topic related to resale royalties, it is instructive to address the various changes that are occurring in the modern art market. The movements towards a more
globalized and digital world will continue to have implications on
the art market in the future. Not only has art become more accessible to the public, but new unprecedented legal issues will have to
be addressed with future legislation. In its report on resale royalties, the United States Copyright Office made it clear that it did not
have any evidence that the growth in art fairs and other nontraditional art market transactions is20 7a result of the implementation
of resale royalties across the globe.
a. Art Fairsand the Online Market
Over the past twenty years, the art market has undergone a
revolution secondary to an increase in sales in art fairs. 208 There
has been a strong movement towards these fairs where buyers can
purchase works of art directly from dealers and artists as a competitive reaction to the increased power that auction houses possess. 20 9 Today, fairs comprise about thirty percent of dealers'
sales. 210 These fairs are open to the public and have allowed the
Elliot C. Alderman, Resale Royalties in the United States for Fine Visual Artists: An Alien Concept, 40 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 265, 277 (1992).
206 Id.
207 USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 55.
208 Claire McAndrew, The InternationalArt Market in 2011: Observations on
the Art Trade over 25 Years, 65 (2012).
209 McAndrew, at 113.
"o Id. at 114.
205
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traditional exclusivity of the art market to thrive in a more general
setting. 21 1 This allows people who normally would not be able to
collect art to be immersed into the primary and secondary art markets. Art fairs have affected both the primary and secondary art
markets because artists now have to surrender their own creative
habits to the demands of the art fair schedule.212
The presence of the Internet in art transactions has also advanced the art market. The use of the Internet has created more efficient and cost-effective methods for parties to not only communicate but also to engage in transactions, regardless of physical
location.213 Currently, many dealers and auction houses have both
websites to provide buyers with information and real-time participation in auctions. 2 14 Not only are major auction houses and dealers moving toward an online market, but according to the 2013
Online Art Trade Report, fifty-nine percent of the galleries that
were surveyed are planning to incorporate an online purchase option on their websites. 215 This shows a major trend toward an art
market on the Internet and the potential decrease in the personal
interaction with dealers and auction houses, thus decreasing the
tension that exists between them. "Emergence and growth of Internet marketplaces during the last two decades have fostered an
increase in artistic endeavors by providing more outlets for discovery and remuneration."216

211
212

USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 25.
Graham Bowley, For Art Dealers, a New Life on the Fair Circuit, N.Y.

TIMES,
Aug.
21,
2013,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/201 3 /08/ 2 2 /arts/for-art-dealers-a-new-life-on-the-faircircuit.html.
213 USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 25.
214
See
How
to
Place
a
Bid,
BONHAMS,
http://www.bonhams.com/howtobuy/9879/; Christie's LIVE Online Bidding,
CHRISTIE'S,
https://www.christies.com/livebidding/;
BIDnow/Watch Live,
SOTHEBY'S, http://www.sothebys.com/en/auctions/watch-live.html.
215 The Online Art Trade 2013, Hiscox & ARTTACTIC,
4-5 (April 9, 2013)
available at http://www.
arttactic.com/market-analysis/art-markets/us-aeuropean-art-market/559-hiscox-report-online-art-trade- 2013.html?Itemid= 102.
216 eBay, Inc., Comments Submitted in Response to
U.S. Copyright Office's
Sept. 19, 2012 Notice of Inquiry at 3 (Dec. 5, 2012).
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b. Changes in Artistic Medium
Although United States' copyright law does not affect the
typical visual artist in the same manner as other types of artists,
visual artists have been able to adapt. The popularity of art reproductions has allowed visual artists to benefit in the same manner as
other artists. The ability of artists to sell reproductions, or "prints"
of their works allows them to receive economic compensation by
selling copies of their works.2 17 Prints have become a significant
influence in the art market as major collectors and museums have
purchased these artworks. 2 18 It is important to note that artists are

adapting to the changes in the art market as well as being able to
adjust their craft in order to benefit more from the United States'
copyright system. Supporters of a droit de suite constantly make
the argument that visual artists do not receive the same benefits as
other artists, yet in some ways and in some mediums artists can
benefit.
IV. AMERICAN ROYALTIES Too ACT OF 2014 - MOST RECENTLY
PROPOSED LEGISLATION

The Proposed "American Royalties Too Act of 2014"
aimed to provide a royalty to visual artists whose art was resold at
auction. It was introduced on February 26, 2014 by the New York
Democrat Representative Jerrold Nadler to amend title 17 of the
United States Code. 219 His major cosponsor was the Democrat
Senator from Wisconsin, Tammy Baldwin. 220 As of October 2014,
221 and
he had fifteen cosponsors in the House of Representatives
217

These "prints" include etchings, silkscreens, lithographs, aquatints, and ste-

reographs. Vickers, at 463.
218 The Applicability of Droit de Suite, at 463.
2 19 American Royalties Too Act of 2014, H.R. 4103, 113th Cong. This provision
is concerned with an individual's copyrights.
220 Cosponsors of the American Royalties Too Act of 2014, available at

https://www.congress.gov/bill/I 13th-congress/senate-bill/2045/cosponsors.
221 They are, in chronological order of becoming co-sponsors: Louise McIntosh
Slaughter [D-NY-25], James P. Moran [D-VA-8], Grace Meng [D-NY-6], Wm.
Lacy Clay [D-MO-1], Eliot L. Engel [D-NY-16], Donna M. Christensen [D-V1At Large], Judy Chu [D-CA-27], John Lewis [D-GA-5], Janice D. Schakowsky
[D-IL-9], Ed Pastor [D-AZ-7], Maxine Waters [D-CA-43], Sam Farr [D-CA-
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one additional co-sponsor in the Senate222. This bill, however, was
unable to survive the 113 th Congress and was never voted on before the end of the term.223
A. Text of the Bill
The bill proposed that in order to be eligible to collect a resale royalty, the work of visual art must be resold at auction at a
price of $5,000 or more. 224 The proposed bill made it clear that the
artwork must be sold at auction by an individual who is not the
original artist, thus ensuring that this was not the first sale of the
work, but was indeed a resale. 225 An artist would receive a royalty
on the initial sale because he directly sold his work to the buyer either by himself or through an auction or dealer representing the
artist.
The text of the proposed bill defined the specifics of collecting the royalty. The royalty would be calculated as 5% of the
sale price up to a cap of $35,000.226 These figures would be adjusted every year according to the cost-of-living adjustment provided by that year's Internal Revenue Code of 1986.227 The royalties would be collected within ninety days of the sale by a visual
artists' copyright collecting society which, four or more times a
year would distribute the royalty less reasonable administrative
costs to the artist or the valid copyright holder. 2 28 The proposed
bill also defined the eligibility of an artist, or current copyright

20], Mark Pocan [D-WI-2], Theodore E. Deutch [D-FL-2 1], and Shelia Jackson
Lee [D-TX- 18]. See: https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/housebill/4103/cosponsors.
222 Senator Edward J. Markey, a Democrat from Massachusetts
is the only Senate co-sponsor of this bill. https://www.congress.gov/bill/11 3 th-congress/senatebill/2045/cosponsors?q=%7B%2
2search%22%3A%5B%22american+royalties+too%22%5D%7D.
223

Coline Milliard, No Artist Resale Rights for US, for Now, ARTNETNEWS,

(Jan. 14, 2015), available at http://news.artnet.com/market/no-artist-resalerights-for-us-for-now-220318.
224 American Royalties Too Act of 2014, H.R. 4103, 113th Cong., §(a)(7).
225 Id. at §(a)(7).
226 Id. at §§ 3(b)(2)(A)(i)-(ii).
227 Id. at §§ 3(B)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).
228 Id. at §§ 3(b)(3)(A)-(B)
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holder, to receive royalty payment. 2 29 The artist or current copyright owner must have been either a citizen, currently domiciled in,
or another
or created the work of visual art in the United States
230
rights.
royalty
resale
provides
already
country that
The proposed bill had many criteria required of a valid colThis visual artists' copyright collecting society
lecting society.
would be approved to collect the royalties from the auction houses
owner. 23 2
and distribute them to the artists or the valid copyright
In order to become an authorized artists' copyright collecting society, the society must have either had previous experience licensing
copyrights of visual artists or have been approved by 10,000 or
more visual artists "directly or thought reciprocal agreements with
foreign collecting societies, to license the rights granted under section 106. ",233 If an artists' copyright collecting society failed to
distribute the royalties within five years, it would lose its authorization to collect and distribute future royalties. 234 If an artists'
copyright collecting society failed to pay a royalty, it could have
subject to payment of the enconstituted as copyright infringement
235
damages.
statutory
and
tire royalty
Finally, the proposed bill required the Register of Copyrights to conduct a study within five years which would explore
the effects of this proposed bill on the art market and whether this
act should be expanded to "other professionals engaged in the sale
of works of visual art" such as dealers and galleries.

229
23°

231

American Royalties Too Act of 2014 at §§ 3(b)(6).
Id. at §§ 3(b)(6)(A)-(B).
Id. at §§ 3(b)(3)(A)(1)(ii), § 5.

232 Id. at
233

§ 3(b)(3)(A)(ii).

Id. at §§ 5 (A)(i)()-(I1). In the United States, some of the artists' copyright

collection agencies include VAGA (http://vagarights.com) and Artists Rights
Society of New York (http://www.arsny.com). For a comprehensive list of
world-wide copyright collection societies see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki
/List of copyrightcollectionsocieties.
234 American Royalties Too Act of 2014, H.R. 4103, 113th Cong., § 5(A)(ii)
235 Id. at §§ 3(b)(4)(A)-(B).
236 ld.at § 6
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B. Opposition

The American Royalties Too Act of 2014 faced a great
deal of opposition, especially since it specifically targeted public
auction houses. According to Clare McAndrew, from Art Economics, only "0.4 percent of artists in the U.S. will benefit from [a
droit de suite]."23 7 If such a small number of artists would benefit
from this bill, it raises the question whether it is fair on even beneficial for this bill to have solely applied to public auction houses?
Many auction houses in the United States strongly lobbied
against this bill, since it did specifically target sales at auction. Sotheby's spent approximately $1 million in lobbying efforts. 2 38 Despite doubts that the bill would pass due to a divided Congress, Sotheby's approached this bill seriously.2 39The bill appeared to be
unfairly directed at auction houses because the droit de suite
would not apply to dealers or galleries. Christie's and Sotheby's,
through their attorney, Simon J. Frankel, responded to the Copyright Office's Notice of Inquiry into the possibility of implementing a droit de suite in the United States and expressed their opposition to the legislation. 240 They argued that a resale royalty would
do nothing to increase the market for emerging artists, stating that
"absent identification of an actual problem in the art market to be
addressed and compelling evidence that a resale royalty will do so,
there are no good reasons to enact a federal resale royalty right in
24 1
the country, and many reasons not to do so.

237

Resale Royalty Round Table, at 121.

238 Patricia Cohen, Lobbyists Set to Fight Royalty Bill For Artists, THE
NEW
YORK
TIMES.
(March
23,
2014).
Available
at

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/24/arts/design/auction-houses-taking-nochances-on-american-royalties-too-act.html?r=0
239 id.

240
241

Letter: Comments of Sotheby's, Inc. and Christie's Inc. (Dec. 5, 2012).
Letter: Comments of Sotheby's, Inc. and Christie's Inc. (Dec. 5, 2012).
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V. ANALYSIS
A. PotentialIssues and Pitfalls
1. Administration
A major pitfall of the California Resale Royalties Act involved collecting and administering the royalty collected by a collection agency. The text of the bill does give specifics regarding
becoming an authorized collection agency, but it does not discuss
how the collection agency needs to function in order to be successful. 2 4 2 In order to have a practical resale royalty in the United
States, it must be inexpensive to regulate and administer the royalty and it must be enforceable. These were issues that the California
Resale Royalty Act faced and were potential problems for the
American Royalties Too Act. A major reason why the American
Royalties Too Act targeted auction houses is because artists can
much more easily verify that their art is being resold in a public
auction verses being resold in a private gallery.
2. Art Market TransparencyandLack of Information on the Art
Market
When researching the possible effects or consequences of
implementing a droit de suite in the United States, policymakers
face an "information problem. 2 4 3 In order to properly analyze the
actual or potential impact of a resale royalty in the United States, a
certain amount of information must be available to the parties involved.24 4 In the real world application, however, those involved
in the United States market guard this information because of the
lack of transparency in the art market. For example, buyers' and
sellers' identities are often kept secret and the values of artworks
are concealed from the public to promote anonymity in the trans-

242 American Royalties Too Act of 2014, H.R. 4103,

113th Cong., §§ 5

(3)(A)(i)(I)-(II).
243 Stephanie B. Turner, The Artist's Resale Royalty Right: Overcoming the Information Problem, 19 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 329, 333 (2012).
244 Id.at 334.
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actions.24 5 The prices of these private sales are not recorded or
available to the public.2 46 When the United States Copyright Office issued its 1992 report, it realized that there was an "information problem" and even cited this as one of the reasons that it
advised against adopting a droit de suite; 247 the USCO believed
that it did not have enough "empirical data" to adequately analyze
the outcomes of implementing this right. 2 48 Even the 2013 USCO
Resale Royalties Report stated that it faced difficulties when trying
to analyze data on resale royalties because the majority of that data
comes from the same one or two sources. 249 This can be problematic because different sides of the droit de suite argument will support their respective arguments with the same data.2 50 Obtaining
solid data on the art market is difficult because it is almost impossible to conduct a "controlled experiment and use scientific meth25
od." 1
Despite the major informational obstacles that must be
overcome in order to have a more accurate understanding of resale
royalties, there have been improvements. Over the past twenty
years, many new auction price databases, indexes, and analyses resources have emerged 2 These new resources have increased the
245 Erica Coslor, Transparency in an Opaque Market: Auction Prices as Anchors
and Guideposts, 16 (March 22, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
U.S. Copyright Office), available at
http://aahvs.duke.edu/uploads/media-items/coslor-transparency-in-an-opaquemarket-03-22-201 l.original.pdf.
246
Id. at pg. 16.
247 See 1992 REPORT at vii, x, 3, 101, 145.
248
See 1992 REPORT at xv.
249 USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 27. These sources are: Art Economics (see
http://www.artseconomi-cs.com) and the studies performed by Kathryn Graddy
et al.
250 Resale Royalties Round Table, pg 103 (Victor S. Perlman).
251Resale Royalties Round Table, pg 103 (Victor S. Perlman). Itisdifficult to
figure out causality because "there is no way to conduct a controlled experiment
and use scientific method. All we have is some anecdotal information and statistics."
252 Anna Dempster, Trust, but verify, as they say, THE
ART NEWSPAPER, (July
11, 2013), available at http://www.theartnewspaper.com/articles/Trust-butverify-as-they-say/30096.
These resources include: ArtPrice (http://www.artprice.com), ArtNet
(http://www.artnet.com), Invaluable (http://www.invaluable.com!), Art Market
Research
(http://www.artmarketresearch.com),
Mei
Moses
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transparency of the art market, but there are still many flaws in the
data.2 3 The lack of this information from these transactions prevents accurate results and adds to the uncertainty about the art
market. For example, there is even confusion about the number of
private sales that take place.254 This lack of information not only
prevents proper studies from being conducted on the possible effects of the droit de suite, but it could potentially impact the success of a resale royalty.
3. Sales and Works Subject to a Resale Royalty
The bill made it clear that the resale royalty would have
applied to "works of visual art" and the bill even proposed to consolidate the language in 17 U.S.C. § 101's definition for "works of
visual art." 255 Initially, there was some opposition to this because it
did not include works of decorative art such as jewelry, furniture,
architectural structures, and rugs.256 However, no one submitted
any empirical evidence that these items receive substantial profits
of visual art"
on the secondary market, so the definition for "works
25 7
did not need to be expanded to include these items.
Additionally, with the continuing transformation of the art
market, this bill could have encountered issues because many major auction houses now have online auctions. This bill could have
(http://www.artasanasset.com/), ArtTactic (http://www.arttactic.com/),
Skate's Art Market Research (http://skatesartinvestment.com/).

and

253 Id.

Erica Coslor estimates that private sales account for about 60% of the art
market while public auctions make up about 40%, while Clare McAndrew stated that "in 2012, auction houses accounted for just 21 percent of domestic sales,
with dealers and galleries accounting for 79 percent." McAndrew, Clare. 2007.
The Art Economy: An Investor's Guide to the Art Market. Dublin: Liffey Press.
255 The bill proposed to changed the definition of "work of visual art" to "A
'work of visual art' is a painting, drawing, print, sculpture, or photograph, existing either in the original embodiment or in a limited edition of 200 copies or
fewer that bear the signature or other identifying mark of the author and are
consecutively numbered by the author, or, in the case of a sculpture, in multiple
cast, carved, or fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer that are consecutively
numbered by the author and bear the signature or other identifying mark of the
author." H.R. 4103 § 2(4)
256
USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 76.

254

25 7

id.
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unfairly targeted auction houses because their online sales would
be subject to a royalty, but other online art auctions or dealers who
sell online would not have to pay the royalty. 8 It would have
been difficult to distinguish how the bill would have treated a
regular auction selling online versus other online transactions that
resell art. The bill did define an auction as "apublic sale at which a
work of visual art is sold to the highest bidder and which is run by
an entity that sold not less that $1,000,000 of works of visual art
during the previous year." 259 This definition, with the threshold
profit off of visual art sales, applies to larger auction houses, thus
many minor auctions would not have had to pay a resale royalty.
4. Alienability andRetroactivity
The bill stated, "the right to collect a royalty... may not be
sold, assigned, or waived except as provided in section 201 .,260
Section 201 of the Copyright Act allows an individual to transfer
his copyright rights "by any means of conveyance." 26 1 What this
means is that the resale royalty right cannot be alienated unless it
is in the same manner as transferring copyright rights; a visual artist can alienate this right. This is not in harmony with the EU Directive because its droit de suite is both inalienable and unassignable. 262 This may be counterproductive in trying to provide
artists more bargaining power. By being able to sign away their resale royalty rights, it is just another right in the bundle of copyright
rights that artists sometimes sign over to purchasers in the primary
market. If this bill made the right absolutely inalienable, it could
have focused on some artists' bargaining power. Critics, however,
argue that if this right was inalienable, many artists would not be
258

"[A resale royalty] also disregards the way the art market is changing. For

instance, Christie's does online auctions too. Because we're an auction house,
we should be subject to a resale royalty on those auctions. Yet, eBay or any of
the other, Gagosian is moving into doing online sales. There are a number of
other entities who are doing eCommerce auctions. Those would be exempt. So
this bill, even besides just targeting one portion, it targets it unfairly." Sandra
Cobden, Christie's Inc, Resale Royalty Round Table, at 211.
259 H.R. 4103 § 2(1).
260 H.R. 4103 § 3(6).
26117 U.S.C. § 201 (d)(1)
262 USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 78.
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able to make as much in the primary art market because now many
sign their rights away to ensure a better purchase price. 263 If an artist could not transfer these rights, he might not receive as much
profit from his initial sale.
Another issue with alienability is with reciprocity and the
Berne Convention. The Berne Convention states that droit de suite
is an "inalienable right." 264 If the United States enacted legislation
that allowed an artist's resale royalty right to be alienable, there
would be inconsistencies in reciprocity with other countries since
most countries have this as an inalienable right.265 If other countries find the United State's law insufficient compared to theirs,
United States' artists may have difficulties benefitting from droit
de suite abroad.2 66 This, again, is counterproductive because the
bill was first enacted in order to promote international reciprocity.
The text of the bill would have applied prospectively. This is important because if it were to have been applied retroactively, many
more Fifth Amendment issues, such as Takings and Due Process,
would have been challenged.267 The text of the bill, however, was
vague regarding the specifics of application prospectively. For example, the Copyright Office's 1992 report defined a prospective
application of a droit de suite as covering works of art that were
created after the effective date of the law. 268 Difficulties could
arise, however, in proving when some artworks were created if
disputes arise around whether a work of art was created before or
after the effective date. Another possible way to bypass this issue
would be for this bill to have applied to works of art that were resold after the effective date. This could be more easily manageable
because the date of creation is irrelevant. Most artists sell their
work directly in the primary market, so any transaction not from
the artist or his dealer would be considered a secondary market
transaction, thus a resale. The American Royalties Too Act should
have been more specific in its language in terms of how it is going
to be applied.
263

id.

264

Berne Convention 14ter(1).

265

USCO Resale Royalty Report, at 78.

266 id.
267

Id at 77.

268 1992 Report, at 155.
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B. Possiblealternatives to resale royalty legislation

1. Private Contracts- Artists 'Reserved Rights Transfer and Sale
Agreement
There have been attempts to ensure an artist's resale royalty rights through contracts between the artist and the buyer. One of
the most famous contracts was the Artists' Reserved Rights Transfer and Sales Agreement, or the "Projansky Agreement" which
was drafted and published in 1971 by New York Lawyer Robert
Projansky in association with the art dealer Seth Siegelaub. 269 According to this contract, every time a purchaser resold the artwork,
the artist would receive fifteen-percent of the proceeds. 270 In order
to ensure that the artist would receive proceeds for each resale, the
contract would follow the work of art. 27 1 This was done by permanently fixing notice of the covenant on the work of art and having
the purchaser agree not to alienate or sell the work without binding
2 72
the new buyer to this covenant.
Despite being able to contract an artist's resale royalty
rights, there are still many drawbacks to not only the Projansky
Agreement, but also the idea of contracting an artist's rights. In
normal transactions, most artists do not have significant bargaining
power, so it may be extremely difficult to convince a purchaser to
sign a contract that binds him and future purchasers to pay an artist's resale royalty right.2 7 3 Another issue with contracting a droit
de suite is enforcement; if this covenant follows the artwork
throughout every resale, it may be extremely difficult to enforce
this right if the artwork is continually resold. Not only would it be
difficult to enforce this contract if it is resold, it may also be difficult to resell the artwork with this provision that the new buyer
must give the artist fifteen-percent of the proceeds if he resells the
artwork at a future date.2 74

269

Vickers, at 448.

270 Projansky Agreement, Art. Two
(b)
271

Projansky Agreement, Art. Five

272 Projansky Agreement, Art. Two, Art. Five
273

Vickers, at 449.

274 Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION

It is a difficult to find a balance between the United States'
domestic rights and how to better harmonize with the international
art market, which shows why droit de suite has been so problematic to establish in the United States. Until the information problem
is confronted, an accurate and well-calculated decision for a droit
de suite cannot be made. For Congress to be successful in implementing a resale royalty, it must stop targeting just auction houses
and find a way for it to be more fairly administered throughout the
United States. It seems unlikely that Congress will be successful in
passing federal legislation for artist's resale royalties, especially if
it continues to target only a small portion of the secondary art
market. If Representative Nadler is to be successful in passing an
American droit de suite, he needs to base his bill on empirical data
and to be able to show that American artists need this right; two
pieces of information he may struggle to substantiate due to the
lack of overall data in the art market as a whole. Additionally, the
"American Royalties Too Act of 2014" had many issues that needed to be addressed in order to even be implementable, another reason for its failure. It is a good idea to try to implement more moral
rights for visual artists in the United States; however due to the inherent issues and pitfalls it will likely never be an artists' right.
Michelle Janevicius
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